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YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, BUT ANYTHING 
YOU DON’T SAY MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU:  
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SILENCE AS EVIDENCE AFTER 
SALINAS v. TEXAS 
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) 
 
Adam M. Hapner* 
In Salinas v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
suspect’s refusal to answer an officer’s questions during a noncustodial, 
pre-Miranda, criminal interrogation is admissible at trial as substantive 
evidence of guilt.1 In a plurality decision, Justice Samuel Alito 
emphasized that before a suspect can rely on the privilege against self-
incrimination, the suspect must invoke the privilege.2 Consequently, 
because silence does not invoke the privilege,3 and because the 
petitioner failed to expressly invoke the privilege in words, the 
prosecutor’s use of his pre-Miranda silence during a noncustodial 
interrogation did not violate the Fifth Amendment.4 
The Salinas decision is important because it gives insight into the 
extent that the constitutional right to remain silent truly protects citizens 
while speaking—or refusing to speak—to law enforcement.5 
Furthermore, the decision created new rules governing the admissibility 
of silence evidence that may have a significant effect at trial and at 
sentencing.6 After explaining the Salinas decision in more detail, this 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D., 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thank you to the current 
members, staff, and faculty advisor of the Florida Law Review for your support. Thanks also to 
Professor John Stinneford for your advice and encouragement. 
 1. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177–78 (2013) (holding that the use at trial of 
the petitioner’s silence to suggest “that he was guilty” was constitutional because the petitioner 
did not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
 2. Id. at 2178. 
 3. Id.; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010). 
 4. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 5. See Christopher Totten, Salinas v. Texas: Guilt by Silence and the Disappearing Fifth 
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1501, 1501 (2013) 
(describing Salinas both as a continuation the Court’s “long-standing trend” of limiting Miranda 
protections and as “a more frontal attack on the Fifth Amendment right . . . against self-
incrimination”); Adam Liptak, A 5-4 Ruling, One of Three, Limits Silence’s Protection, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/supreme-court-hands-down-
three-decisions-that-are-5-to-4.html (stating that Salinas “limited a criminal suspect’s right to 
remain silent before being taken into custody”).  
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 69–74; Totten, supra note 5, at 1501 (“By 
permitting defendants’ silence in response to noncustodial police interrogation to be used 
against them as evidence of their guilt at trial, the [Salinas] judgment unjustifiably exposes 
defendants to the risk of wrongful conviction.”); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 
(1999) (noting the high stakes associated with negative inferences at criminal trials and during 
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Comment briefly discusses the Supreme Court’s development of rules 
governing the evidentiary admissibility of silence that occurs during 
questioning by law enforcement.7 Then, this Comment addresses how 
Salinas has changed that framework. Finally, this Comment explains 
how Salinas implied the “right” answer to the only question regarding 
the admissibility of silence evidence that remains today.  
In Salinas, local police were investigating a double homicide when 
they visited the petitioner at his home in Houston, Texas.8 The 
petitioner agreed to accompany the police to the station for questioning, 
and also voluntarily handed over his shotgun for ballistics testing.9 For 
most of the approximately hour-long, noncustodial interview that 
followed, the petitioner answered the police officer’s questions.10 “But 
when asked whether his shotgun ‘would match the shells recovered at 
the scene of the murder,’ the petitioner declined to answer.”11 
After receiving additional evidence from a witness who claimed to 
hear the petitioner confess to the killings, prosecutors charged the 
petitioner with committing both murders.12 During the murder trial, the 
prosecutor used the petitioner’s refusal to answer the officer’s question 
as evidence of his guilt.13 For example, the “prosecutor told the jury, 
among other things, that ‘[a]n innocent person’ would have said, ‘What 
are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I wasn’t there.’”14 The petitioner 
was subsequently found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty years 
in prison.15 The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld the petitioner’s 
conviction and rejected his argument that the prosecutor’s use of his 
silence violated the Fifth Amendment, “reasoning that the petitioner’s 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was not ‘compelled’ within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment.”16  
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve a division of 
authority” in the federal circuit courts.17 Specifically, it framed the issue 
                                                                                                                     
sentencing, and that “the inference drawn by the District Court from petitioner’s silence may 
have resulted in decades of added imprisonment”). 
 7. This Comment does not address silence occurring at trial (i.e., when the defendant 
refuses to testify), or the merits of any of the Supreme Court’s decisions that are discussed. 
 8. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. Importantly, both the petitioner and the prosecutor agreed that the petitioner was 
not in custody or given Miranda warnings at any time during the questioning. Id. 
 11. Id. (citation omitted).  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Salinas v. State, 
368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. App. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion); id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion) (citing Salinas, S.W.3d at 557–59). The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed on the same ground. Id. at 2179 (citing Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 
176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). 
 17. Id. at 2179 (citation omitted). 
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in the case as “whether the prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial police 
interview as part of its case in chief.”18 The Court declined to answer 
that question, however, because the petitioner did not assert his 
privilege.19 
The privilege against self-incrimination comes from the Fifth 
Amendment’s declaration that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”20 This privilege 
permits an individual not only to refuse to testify against himself in a 
criminal trial, but also to refuse to answer an official’s questions “where 
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”21 In 
other words, the Fifth Amendment creates a “right to remain silent” 
both at trial and during interrogation by law enforcement.22 
As Salinas emphasized, however, the privilege against self-
incrimination is not self-executing.23 To claim its protection, a witness 
must unambiguously invoke the privilege, absent exceptional 
circumstances.24 For example, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court 
previously held that the defendant’s silence for two hours and forty-five 
minutes during a warned custodial interrogation by law enforcement 
was insufficient to invoke his right to remain silent,25 and that he 
implicitly waived his right when he knowingly and voluntarily made 
statements to the police thereafter.26 Although the practical effect of 
Berghuis is highly controversial,27 and the decision dealt more with the 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Id. (emphasis added).  
 19. See id. (“But because petitioner did not invoke the privilege during his interview, we 
find it unnecessary to reach that question.”). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–61 
(1966) (exploring the contours of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in 
the context of in-custody interrogation). 
 21. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 
U.S. 70, 77 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. See id. at 430; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from 
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”).  
 23. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178; accord Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (noting the general rule 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing). 
 24. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010) (“A requirement of an 
unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s] 
difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed in the face of 
ambiguity.” (alterations in original) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59 
(1994))); see Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (finding unpersuasive the petitioner’s argument that the 
“express invocation requirement” is unworkable where a witness is silent). 
 25. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2258–60. 
 26. Id. at 2262–63. 
 27. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (arguing 
that “most[] Americans are aware that they have a constitutional right not to incriminate 
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admissibility of statements made after silence, it nonetheless shows that 
silence itself does not invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment.28 
Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that a person is not 
required to invoke the privilege to claim the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment where the person faces unwarned custodial interrogation.29 
In the groundbreaking case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Court concluded 
that the “process of in-custody interrogation” of suspects contains 
“inherently compelling pressures” that potentially undermine a 
suspect’s opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination.30 As a result, to protect Fifth Amendment interests, the 
Court mandated that all persons subjected to custodial interrogation be 
immediately given Miranda warnings, informing them of their right to 
remain silent and that anything they say may be used against them, 
among other things.31 If Miranda warnings are not given to a suspect in 
custody, the suspect is not required to unambiguously invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination during interrogation in order to 
assert the protection of the Fifth Amendment.32  Thus, after Miranda, 
the issue of whether silence occurred post-custody33 is significant to 
                                                                                                                     
themselves by answering questions posed by the police during an interrogation” but are likely 
not aware of the “technical legal requirements” to invoke the right); Steven I. Friedland, Post-
Miranda Silence in the Wired Era: Reconstructing Real Time Silence in the Face of Police 
Questioning, 80 MISS. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2011); Stephen Rushin, Rethinking Miranda: The Post-
Arrest Right to Silence, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 158 (2011) (arguing that while simple to apply, 
the Berghuis default rule may “fundamentally undermine the protections offered by Miranda”); 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogation and the Roberts Court, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1194, 1202–
09 (2011) (arguing, inter alia, that Berghuis “effectively eliminated” the waiver requirement, 
altering the protections afforded by Miranda); cf. Janet Ainsworth, ‘You Have the Right to 
Remain Silent . . .’ But Only if You Ask for It Just So, 15 INT’L. J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 1, 19 
(2008) (arguing that Miranda “rights are perilously easy to waive and nearly impossible to 
actually invoke”). 
 28. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60; accord Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182. 
 29. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (stating that custodial interrogation is a situation 
“where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary”); Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429–30 (1984) (noting that an exception to the general rule requiring 
suspects to assert the privilege may exist where “some identifiable factor” limits the suspect’s 
ability to freely admit, deny, or refuse to answer).  
 30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  
 31. Id. at 467–74; accord Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259; Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (“Due 
to the uniquely coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a suspect in custody cannot be said to 
have voluntarily forgone the privilege ‘unless [he] fails to claim [it] after being suitably 
warned.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430)). 
 32. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (noting that the Court has held that “a witness’ failure 
to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the 
privilege involuntary,” and that, under Miranda, a suspect who is subjected to the pressures of 
unwarned custodial interrogation “need not invoke the privilege” to claim the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment (emphasis added)). 
 33. For purposes of this Comment, “post-custody silence” is defined as silence that occurs 
while the suspect was “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (i.e., while “in 
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determining the admissibility of silence evidence under the Fifth 
Amendment.34 In fact, placing a suspect into custody may now be 
viewed as the “triggering mechanism” for the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.35 
Furthermore, after Miranda, the issue of whether the silence 
occurred before or after Miranda warnings is also significant to 
determining the admissibility of silence evidence. In footnote thirty-
seven of the opinion, the Court stated that once the police give Miranda 
warnings to a suspect who is in custody, “[t]he prosecution may 
not . . . use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in 
the face of accusation.”36 This dictum proved true in the following 
Supreme Court cases that addressed the admissibility of silence 
evidence. Indeed, in all of these cases, the dispositive factor was 
whether Miranda warnings were given before the defendants’ silence. 
For example, in Doyle v. Ohio, the Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether the impeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence violated any provision of the federal Constitution.37 In 
Doyle, two defendants were arrested and tried separately for selling 
marijuana.38 Before trial, the defendants did not offer an exculpatory 
explanation for their arrest.39 But at trial, each defendant testified that he 
was framed by a third party.40 The prosecutor then attempted to 
impeach the defendants’ credibility on cross-examination by asking 
each defendant why he had not told the “frameup story” to the arresting 
officer.41 Although the Court did not address the issue under the Fifth 
Amendment, it held that the prosecutor’s use of their post-arrest, post-
                                                                                                                     
custody”). See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Accordingly, post-custody silence may occur before, 
during, and after arrest. See Benjamin Berkley, Demeanor Evidence Does Not Demean 
Anything: How Exposure to Mass Media Provides a Solution to the Question of Whether 
Demeanor Evidence Should Be Admissible as Substantive Evidence of Guilt Post-Arrest and 
Pre-Miranda, 42 SW. L. REV. 481, 483–85 (2013) (noting that, under Miranda, the right to 
remain silent is triggered once a suspect is in custody, whether or not the suspect has been 
placed under arrest). 
 34. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68 (holding that a suspect in custody who is subjected 
to interrogation must be informed of the right to remain silent in unequivocal terms); infra note 
70 and accompanying text. 
 35. Berkley, supra note 33, at 483–85 (citing United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 
(D.C. Cir. 1997)) (arguing that “custody and not interrogation [i]s the trigger for the attachment 
of the Fifth Amendment”); Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Commentary, Do You Have the Right to 
Remain Silent?: The Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. REV. 903, 913–16 
(2007).  
 36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (emphasis added). 
 37. 426 U.S. 610, 612, 616 (1976). 
 38. Id. at 611. 
 39. See id. at 612–13. 
 40. See id. (“Each petitioner took the stand at his trial and admitted practically everything 
about the State’s case except the most crucial point: who was selling the marihuana to whom.”). 
 41. Id. at 613. 
5
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Miranda silence to impeach the defendants violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Court stated that any 
silence that occurs after a suspect has been given Miranda warnings is 
“insolubly ambiguous” and thus not very probative.43 In addition, the 
Court stated that the Miranda warnings implicitly assure those who 
receive the warnings that their silence will not carry a penalty.44 As a 
result, once Miranda warnings have been given, “it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the 
arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial.”45  
Next, in Jenkins v. Anderson, a prosecutor similarly used silence to 
impeach the defendant at trial.46 However, because the defendant had 
not received Miranda warnings when he was silent, the Court came to 
the opposite conclusion.47 In regard to due process, the Court held that 
the defendant’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible to 
impeach the defendant because the government had not induced him to 
remain silent by administering Miranda warnings.48 As a result, the 
“fundamental unfairness” present in Doyle was not present in Jenkins.49 
The Court also held that using pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence to 
impeach the defendant did not violate the Fifth Amendment because 
individuals waive some of their protection by voluntarily choosing to 
testify.50 Thus, pursuant to Jenkins, a prosecutor does not violate due 
process or the Fifth Amendment by using pre-custody, pre-Miranda 
silence for impeachment.51 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 619. 
 43. See id. at 617 (“Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the 
arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights.”). One term earlier, the Court decided United States 
v. Hale, which held that pre-custody, post-Miranda silence was inadmissible to impeach under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence because silence after receipt of Miranda warnings is not very 
probative of a defendant’s credibility and also has a significant potential for unfair prejudice. 
422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975). 
 44. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. 
 45. Id. But cf. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408–09 (1980) (declining to extend 
Doyle to situations where a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and has given a post-
custody statement that was factually inconsistent with his testimony at trial). 
 46. 447 U.S. 231, 233–34 (1980). In Jenkins, the prosecutor, on cross-examination, 
questioned the petitioner about his pre-arrest failure to report a stabbing, and again referenced 
the petitioner’s “prearrest silence” during closing argument. Id.  
 47. See id. at 240. 
 48.  Id. (“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before 
arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given 
Miranda warnings.”). 
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 238 (“[I]mpeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his 
cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.”). 
 51. Id. at 238, 240. The Court in Fletcher v. Weir relied on Jenkins and subsequently held 
that post-custody, pre-Miranda silence was also admissible to impeach. See Fletcher v. Weir, 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/8
2014] CASE COMMENT 1769 
 
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Jenkins and Doyle framework governed situations where the prosecutor 
used the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence, rather than to 
impeach. This added a new dimension to the legal framework. In 
contrast to when silence is used for impeachment, the defendant does 
not necessarily testify when silence is used as substantive evidence.52 
Furthermore, the silence is not used to attack the defendant’s credibility. 
Instead, it is used as actual evidence—most often to prove that the 
defendant is guilty as charged by suggesting consciousness of guilt.53  
For example, in Wainwright v. Greenfield, the defendant entered a 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a sexual battery charge.54 At 
trial, the prosecutor used the defendant’s invocation of the right to 
remain silent and requests to consult with counsel as evidence that the 
defendant was, in fact, sane.55 During his closing argument, the 
prosecutor suggested that the defendant’s repeated refusals to speak 
with police without counsel present demonstrated that the defendant 
possessed “a degree of comprehension that was inconsistent with his 
claim of insanity.”56 The jury found the defendant guilty, and the judge 
sentenced him to life imprisonment.57  
Even though the prosecutor in Wainwright used the defendant’s 
silence for an entirely different purpose than the prosecutor in Doyle,58 
the decision in Wainwright once again turned on whether Miranda 
warnings had been read at the time of the silence.59 The Court held that 
the admission of the defendant’s post-custody, post-Miranda silence as 
                                                                                                                     
455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam). The Court again reasoned that the implicit assurance 
in the Miranda warnings that silence would not be used adversely is not present for post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence and therefore due process was not violated. See id.; cf. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 
240. The fact that the suspect was in custody when silent, unlike in Jenkins, was apparently 
immaterial to the due process analysis. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606–07. Moreover, the Court 
did not address any Fifth Amendment concerns. See id. 
 52. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 287 (1986); see also Marcy 
Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 159–61 (2001) (discussing the distinctions between 
the admission of silence for impeachment purposes and the introduction of silence as evidence 
of guilt). 
 53. See Strauss, supra note 52, at 102 n.5 (“[S]ilence may be introduced in the case-in-
chief, as evidence of guilt.”). 
 54. 474 U.S. at 285. 
 55. Id. at 285, 287. 
 56. Id. at 287. 
 57. Id. 
58. Compare Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976) (using the defendant’s silence for 
impeachment), with Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 285 (using the defendant’s silence as evidence of 
sanity). 
59.  See Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 (relying on the fundamental unfairness of using post-
Miranda silence against the defendant). 
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substantive evidence of guilt violated the Due Process Clause,60 
reasoning that, because the police had given Miranda warnings to the 
defendant, the implicit assurance that any silence thereafter would not 
be used against him was present, and therefore, it was a violation of due 
process for the prosecutor to break that promise to the defendant.61  
Unfortunately, the Court did not specifically address any Fifth 
Amendment concerns, or whether the distinction between purposes of 
use was material to the Court’s analysis. Consequently, it was unclear if 
the analysis would change under a different set of facts. Nevertheless, 
after Wainwright, it was clear that whether the defendant received 
Miranda warnings prior to his silence was extremely significant in 
almost all circumstances. If the defendant received Miranda warnings, 
any silence thereafter was inadmissible both to impeach and as 
substantive evidence because it is “fundamentally unfair” to use a 
suspect’s silence against him after the police explicitly informed the 
suspect that he had the right to remain silent.62 If the defendant did not 
receive Miranda warnings, however, there was no issue of fundamental 
unfairness, and any silence was admissible to impeach.63 Nonetheless, 
the Court had not yet addressed the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence 
as substantive evidence. 
Then came Salinas v. Texas.64 In Salinas, the plurality held that the 
petitioner’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible as 
substantive evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment because the 
petitioner did not invoke his right to remain silent.65 In short, since he 
was not in custody and did not meet any other exception to the 
invocation requirement,66 he was required to invoke the privilege 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. (holding that the evidentiary use of an individual’s post-arrest, post-Miranda 
silence was fundamentally unfair). 
61.  See id. 
62.  See id.; Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. 
63.  See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam) (finding no violation 
of due process where the government did not induce the defendant’s post-custody silence 
through the imposition of Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) 
(“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest. The 
failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda 
warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not present in this 
case.”).  
64.  133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). 
65.  Id. at 2180. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, 
and argued that even if the petitioner had invoked the privilege, his claim would fail because the 
prosecutor’s comments regarding his pre-custody silence did not compel him to give self-
incriminating testimony. See id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
66.  Id. at 2180 (majority opinion). The Court explicitly declined to make an additional 
exception to the invocation requirement “for cases in which a witness stands mute and thereby 
declines to give an answer that officials suspect would be incriminating.” Id. at 2180–81. 
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against self-incrimination in order to claim its protection.67 Because he 
did not invoke the privilege through his silence or otherwise, his silence 
was admissible against him as evidence of his guilt.68  
Salinas is significant to the legal framework governing the 
admissibility of silence evidence because the Court’s holding 
demonstrates that pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as 
substantive evidence of guilt unless the suspect has previously invoked 
the right to remain silent.69 In addition, for the first time since Miranda, 
the Court did not focus its analysis of the admissibility of silence 
evidence on Miranda warnings. Instead, custody was more relevant to 
its analysis. In fact, both the plurality and the dissent agreed that if the 
petitioner was in custody, he would not have been required to invoke his 
right to remain silent to have claimed its protection.70  
Salinas also shows that if the petitioner received Miranda warnings 
prior to his silence, his silence would have been inadmissible as 
substantive evidence of guilt.71 Notwithstanding the difference between 
using silence for impeachment and using silence as evidence of guilt, 
Doyle and its progeny implied that using post-Miranda silence for any 
purpose would be inadmissible under the Due Process Clause for 
reasons of fundamental unfairness.72 The Court confirmed this in 
footnote three of the Salinas opinion, where it explained in one sentence 
that under the paradigm set forth by Doyle, due process prohibits 
prosecutors from using pre-custody, post-Miranda silence against the 
defendant.73 Thus, pursuant to Doyle and now Salinas, it is a violation 
                                                                                                                     
67.  See id. at 2178–84 (holding that the petitioner’s failure to expressly invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination precluded a finding that the prosecution’s use of 
noncustodial silence violated the Fifth Amendment). Explaining that most Americans are aware 
that they have a constitutional right to remain silent when being interrogated by the police, the 
dissent would have held that the petitioner need not have expressly invoked the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment because the circumstances gave rise to a “reasonable inference that [the 
petitioner’s] silence derived from an exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights.” See id. at 2189–
90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
68.  Id. at 2178 (majority opinion).  
69.   See id. at 2178, 2180. 
70.  Compare id. at 2180 (“[I]n Miranda, we said that a suspect who is subjected to the 
‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned custodial interrogation need not invoke the 
privilege.” (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1996))), with id. at 2188 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . has made clear that an individual, when silent, need not expressly 
invoke the Fifth Amendment if there are ‘inherently compelling pressures’ not to do so.” 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467)).  
71.  See id. at 2182 n.3 (noting that the Due Process Clause prohibits the prosecution from 
“pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings”). 
72.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
73.  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3. However, the Court distinguished the Salinas case 
from Doyle, reasoning that the rule set forth in Doyle “does not apply where a suspect has not 
received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him.” See id. 
(citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980)). 
9
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of due process for a prosecutor to use pre-custody, post-Miranda silence 
at trial, whether the use is for substantive evidence of guilt or for 
impeachment.74 
The Court, however, did not specifically address how the analysis 
would change if the petitioner was in custody but had not yet received 
Miranda warnings. It held only that because the petitioner was not in 
custody, he was required to invoke the privilege or else his silence could 
be used against him.75 Today, this is the only missing piece to the 
Supreme Court’s legal framework governing the admissibility of silence 
evidence, and there is currently a division of authority among federal 
circuit courts on this issue.76 The split among the circuit courts is 
primarily predicated on a disagreement over whether administering 
Miranda warnings must trigger the right to remain silent, and whether a 
constitutional distinction between the use of silence evidence for 
impeachment and its use as evidence of guilt actually exists.77 
The Fourth,78 Fifth,79 Eighth,80 and Eleventh81 Circuits have all held 
that post-custody, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as evidence of 
guilt. Most of these circuits understandably found Miranda warnings to 
                                                                                                                     
74.  See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3. 
75.  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180–84; Totten, supra note 5, at 1514 (noting Salinas, 133 
S. Ct. at 2182 n.3). 
76.  Berkley, supra note 33, at 485. For a chart summarizing the Supreme Court’s rules 
governing the admissibility of silence evidence after Salinas, see Appendix infra. 
77.  Berkley, supra note 33, at 485–86. 
78.  See United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that silence 
evidence was admissible to prove guilt because the defendants were not given Miranda 
warnings); Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that silence 
evidence was admissible to prove guilt where the record was unclear as to whether the 
defendant received Miranda warnings, and where the defendant was not under interrogation by 
any police officer at the time of silence).  
79.  See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 755–59 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that, 
pursuant to Doyle, the prosecution’s reference to the defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence in its case-in-chief did not violate due process, but declining to answer “whether a 
prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of 
guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”); United States v. 
Garcia-Gil, 133 F. App’x 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s post-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence was admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief); United States v. Musquiz, 
45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the admissibility of post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence evidence to prove guilt “turns on fact specific weighing by the judge”).  
80.  See United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2005) (reiterating its 
prior holding that “the use of postarrest, pre-Miranda silence in a prosecution’s case-in-chief 
was not unconstitutional”); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “the use of Frazier’s silence in the government’s case-in-chief as evidence of guilt 
did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights” because “he was under no government-imposed 
compulsion to speak”). 
81.  See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The government 
may comment on a defendant’s silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is arrested and 
given his Miranda warnings.”). 
10
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be a dispositive factor.82 Relying mainly on Doyle, Fletcher, and 
Jenkins, these circuits reasoned that, because the suspect did not receive 
Miranda warnings, there was no violation of the Due Process Clause or 
the Fifth Amendment in allowing the jury to infer guilt from the post-
custody silence.83 Accordingly, these circuits did not find custody to be 
a dispositive factor, nor did they find a constitutional distinction 
between the two purposes of use.84 
In contrast, the Second,85 Seventh,86 Ninth,87 and District of 
Colombia88 Circuits have all held that post-custody, pre-Miranda 
silence is inadmissible as evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment. 
Explaining that the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution, 
not from Miranda warnings themselves, most of these circuits found 
custody to be a dispositive factor.89 Whereas custody is known as the 
triggering mechanism for Fifth Amendment protection,90 Miranda 
warnings are merely prophylactic rules created by the Court in the 
1960s to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.91 Thus, unlike 
                                                                                                                     
82.  See, e.g., Salinas, 480 F.3d at 757–58; Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568; Love, 767 F.2d at 
1063. But see, e.g., Frazier, 408 F.3d at 1111 (retreating from its prior position that Miranda 
warnings are determinative, and finding that “the more precise issue is whether [the defendant] 
was under any compulsion to speak at the time of his silence”). 
83.  Berkley, supra note 33, at 490; Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden: 
A Case Against the Use of a Defendant’s Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 
59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 378 & n.161 (2006); see, e.g., supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
84.  See sources cited supra note 83.  
 85. See United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that “many 
arrested persons know, without benefit of warnings, that silence is usually golden”). 
 86. See United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the defendant has a “constitutional right to say nothing at all,” and that using 
silence as proof of guilt is prohibited, even in the absence of Miranda warnings); see also 
United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting Seventh Circuit 
precedent barring the defendant’s refusal to talk to the police as evidence of guilt); United States 
v. Ramos, 932 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 87. See United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The privilege 
against self-incrimination prevents the government’s use at trial of evidence of a defendant’s 
silence-not merely the silence itself, but the circumstances of that silence as well.”); United 
States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028–33 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district 
court erred by “allowing the government to comment” on the defendant’s post-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Guam 
v. Veloria, 136 F.3d 648, 652–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the prosecutor’s reference to the 
defendant’s silence was prejudicial and contrary to “clearly announced rules of constitutional 
protection”). 
 88. See United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he law is plain 
that the prosecution cannot, consistent with the Constitution, use a defendant’s silence against 
him as evidence of his guilt.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029; Moore, 104 F.3d at 389. 
 90. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (describing the Miranda warnings as 
“prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights”); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
11
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the protection of the Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection arises once the government places an individual into custody, 
irrespective of whether the government administers Miranda warnings 
to the individual.92 Some of these circuits also argue that there is a 
constitutional difference between using silence to impeach and using 
silence as evidence of guilt.93 Consequently, any reliance on Doyle, 
Fletcher, and Jenkins in this regard is misplaced because those cases 
only spoke to the admissibility of pre-custody silence evidence to 
impeach.94  
Although the Salinas Court seemingly “balked” by not explicitly 
resolving the question presented,95 it did shed light on the current circuit 
split. Similar to the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Court could have come to the same conclusion in Salinas—that the 
petitioner’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible as 
substantive evidence—based solely on the fact that the petitioner did 
not receive Miranda warnings, and its decision would have been 
arguably supported by precedent.96 But by shifting the primary focus 
away from Miranda warnings and towards custody, like the Second, 
Seventh, Ninth, and District of Colombia Circuits, Salinas implied that 
it would be deficient and problematic to use Miranda warnings as the 
dispositive factor for determining the admissibility of silence as 
evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment.97 For example, in Salinas, 
the Court relied on Jenkins to explain that, because the petitioner was 
not given Miranda warnings, there was no issue of fundamental 
unfairness and thus no violation of due process.98 However, it would 
                                                                                                                     
433, 444, 446 (1974) (noting that Miranda warnings are “procedural safeguards” that are “not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but rather “prophylactic standards” laid down 
by the Court in Miranda). 
 92. See Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029. 
 93. See, e.g., Moore, 104 F.3d at 386 (distinguishing between the application of Doyle’s 
due process analysis for the use of silence evidence to impeach and the use of silence evidence 
to prove guilt); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987); 
accord Skrapka, supra note 83, at 401–02 (arguing that there is a distinction between using 
silence evidence to prove guilt and to impeach; namely, the former is protected by enumerated 
principles in the Bill of Rights “that prevent its use as substantive evidence of guilt”). 
 94. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam); Jenkins v. Anderson, 
447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976). 
 95. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013); Totten, supra note 5, at 1504. 
 96. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text. For example, in Jenkins and Fletcher, 
the Court previously indicated that, whether or not the suspect was in custody, pre-Miranda 
silence was admissible to impeach because there was no governmental action inducing the 
petitioner to remain silent. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240; accord Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. 
Similarly, in Salinas, the Court could have said that the petitioner’s silence was admissible as 
evidence of guilt because the petitioner did not receive Miranda warnings and, thus, was not 
induced by governmental action to remain silent. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78. 
 97. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180; supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3. 
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have been illogical and untenable for the Court to say that, because 
there was no issue of fundamental unfairness, the petitioner’s silence 
was also admissible under the Fifth Amendment. Just because there is 
no issue of fundamental unfairness, which is the core concern of due 
process, does not mean that there is no issue of compulsion to self-
incriminate, the core concern of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination.99 In other words, although Miranda warnings 
are highly relevant to a due process analysis, in isolation, they provide 
little guidance when determining the admissibility of silence under the 
Fifth Amendment.100 
Custody, in contrast, makes more sense as the primary factor for 
determining the admissibility of silence evidence under the Fifth 
Amendment.101 Due to the ubiquitous coverage of our criminal justice 
system in the media today, most Americans are aware of their right to 
remain silent, even when Miranda warnings have not been read.102 As a 
result, placing a suspect into custody to conduct a criminal investigation 
may actually “compel” the suspect to remain silent out of fear that 
anything he says may be used against him in a court of law.103 In 
addition, despite the fact that most Americans are not aware of the 
“technical legal requirements” to invoke their right,104 in Salinas, the 
Court reiterated that the Fifth Amendment automatically protects a 
suspect who remains silent in the face of unwarned custodial 
interrogation because a suspect is not required to invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination under such circumstances.105 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 770 (Fla. 1998) (“While the absence of Miranda 
warnings may prevent a federal due process violation from occurring where the defendant’s 
post-arrest silence is used for impeachment purposes, the same is not true of the defendant’s 
right to remain silent.”). 
 100. See Ryan, supra note 35, at 913–16 (“The purpose of the Miranda warnings is not to 
trigger the right itself but only to inform the defendant that he has such a right.”); Hoggins, 718 
So. 2d at 770 (“The United States Supreme Court’s decision finding post-Miranda silence 
violative of the federal constitution is based primarily on due process principles.”). In this 
regard, Miranda warnings are perhaps more appropriately understood as the triggering 
mechanism for supplemental due process protection during interrogation by law enforcement. 
See id. 
 101. See Berkley, supra note 33, at 499; Ryan, supra note 35, at 913–16.  
 102.  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); 
Skrapka, supra note 83, at 358 (“Most Americans have heard [Miranda] warnings recited 
countless times on television shows like Dragnet, Hawaii Five-O, Law and Order, and The 
Wire.”); supra note 85. 
 103.  See Skrapka, supra note 83, at 358–59 (“If most people are at least generally aware of 
their right to remain silent, it follows that a reasonable person who is aware of this right might 
naturally exercise the right when faced with arrest, even before the express warning is given.”). 
 104.  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 105. See id. at 2180 (noting that a suspect who is subjected to unwarned custodial 
interrogation is excused from failing to invoke the privilege because “governmental coercion 
13
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although silence does not invoke the right to remain silent,106 silence 
has never been thought to waive that right.107 Thus, to later use such 
self-incriminating silence against the suspect to suggest consciousness 
of guilt would raise serious Fifth Amendment concerns.108 As a 
practical matter, allowing the use of silence under such circumstances 
may “compel” the defendant to testify at trial, thereby permitting 
impeachment,109 and may create an incentive for law enforcement to 
delay giving Miranda warnings, for example.110  
But even if custody is the primary consideration for determining the 
admissibility of silence under the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings 
and the distinction between purposes of use would still be important 
factors. For example, even if post-custody, pre-Miranda silence is 
inadmissible as evidence of guilt, the same silence may be admissible to 
impeach because Miranda warnings have not been given, and because 
the defendant has voluntarily chosen to waive some of the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection by testifying.111 But if Miranda warnings were 
given, the silence would also be inadmissible to impeach for reasons of 
fundamental unfairness.112 Consequently, both Miranda warnings and 
the purpose of use are still important considerations to determining the 
admissibility of silence in general.  
In conclusion, this Comment argues that post-custody, pre-Miranda 
silence should be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt under the 
Fifth Amendment. In addition, this Comment proposes a simple set of 
                                                                                                                     
makes [the suspect’s] forfeiture of the privilege involuntary”); supra notes 29–32, 35 and 
accompanying text. 
 106. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182. 
 107. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (“[A] valid waiver will not be 
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given . . . .”). 
 108. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To permit a prosecutor to 
comment on a defendant’s constitutionally protected silence would put that defendant in an 
impossible predicament. He must either answer the question or remain silent. If he answers the 
question, he may well reveal, for example, prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or 
suspicious circumstances—even if he is innocent. If he remains silent, the prosecutor may well 
use that silence to suggest a consciousness of guilt.” (citation omitted)); Berkley, supra note 33, 
at 498–500; Skrapka, supra note 83, at 396–402. 
 109. See Totten, supra note 5, at 1512; Skrapka, supra note 83, at 397; Salinas, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the defendant then takes the witness stand in order to 
explain either his speech or his silence, the prosecution may introduce, say for impeachment 
purposes, a prior conviction that the law would otherwise make inadmissible.”); Fletcher v. 
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (allowing the use of post-custody, pre-Miranda 
silence to impeach the defendant at trial). 
 110. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 770 (Fla. 1998) (noting that by “relying on the 
right to remain silent to preclude evidence of and comment upon postarrest silence,” the police 
will not have an incentive to delay administering Miranda warnings); Skrapka, supra note 83, at 
400–01. 
 111. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. 
 112. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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rules that distinguishes between the two purposes of use in determining 
the constitutional admissibility of all silence evidence. Not only does 
this set of rules coincide with all of the Court’s precedents, including 
Salinas, it would resolve the current circuit split and complete the legal 
framework governing the admissibility of silence evidence today. 
The first set of rules addresses the admissibility of silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt. If the suspect was given Miranda 
warnings, was in custody, or had otherwise invoked the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the suspect’s silence is inadmissible as 
evidence of guilt.113 But if the suspect was not given Miranda warnings, 
was not in custody, and failed to invoke the privilege, as in Salinas, the 
suspect’s silence is admissible as evidence of guilt.114 The second set of 
rules addresses the admissibility of silence for the purpose of 
impeachment. Regardless of if the suspect was in custody, if Miranda 
warnings were not given, the suspect’s silence is admissible to impeach 
the suspect if he or she chooses to testify.115 However, if Miranda 
warnings were given, the suspect’s silence is inadmissible to impeach 
the suspect for reasons of fundamental unfairness.116 Having a clear set 
of rules within this complex, unsettled area of law will help to provide 
predictability and uniformity in future cases involving one of our most 
fundamental rights: the right to remain silent. 
                                                                                                                     
 113. If the suspect has received Miranda warnings, the use of silence to prove guilt would 
be a violation of due process. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3 (noting that the use of pre-custody, 
post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence violates due process); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 
474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence as substantive evidence was fundamentally unfair). Assuming there is 
interrogation, if the suspect was in custody and Miranda warnings were not given, or if the 
suspect had otherwise invoked his right to remain silent, the use of silence to prove guilt would 
be a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010) (“The Miranda Court formulated a warning that must 
be given to suspects before they can be subjected to custodial interrogation.”); supra notes 29–
32, 70 and accompanying text; Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975) (stating that by 
exercising the right to remain silent, a defendant can be ensured that the police will terminate 
their interrogation and concomitantly respect the suspect’s exercise of that right). 
 114. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180. 
 115. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 (holding that the prosecutor’s use of post-custody, pre-
Miranda silence to impeach the defendant at trial did not violate due process); Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (holding that “the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle 
[wa]s not present” where “no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before 
arrest”). 
 116. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (“[W]hile it is true that the Miranda 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is 
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to 
be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.”); cf. United States v. Hale, 422 
U.S. 171, 180–81 (1975) (holding that a defendant’s silence during police interrogation lacks 
significant probative value and is “intolerably” prejudicial). 
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?Silence is inadmissible to 
impeach (Doyle). 
 
?Silence is inadmissible to 
prove guilt (Wainwright). 
 
?Silence is inadmissible to 
impeach (Doyle). 
 
?Silence is inadmissible to 







?Silence is admissible to 
impeach (Fletcher). 
 
?There is a split among federal 
circuit courts over whether 
silence is admissible to prove 
guilt. 
 
?Silence is admissible to 
impeach (Jenkins). 
 
?Silence is admissible to prove 
guilt unless the suspect has 
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